Abstract. This paper uses a stochastic dominance approach to test for market efficiency following earnings announcements. We find that the stocks that recently announced good earnings news stochastically dominate those that recently announced bad news. The results cast serious doubt on any belief that asset pricing model misspecifications might explain post-earnings-announcement drift.
I. Introduction
More than two dozen studies have documented that after earnings numbers are announced, stock prices (net of market-wide movements) continue to drift in the direction of the earnings surprise for several months (Ball [1992] , Bernard [1993] ). Such evidence is consistent with a failure of the market to impound earnings information completely at the time it first becomes public. However, given how visible and widely followed are earnings reports, attributions of such evidence to market inefficiency have frequently been greeted with skepticism. An alternative possibility is that drift in the estimated abnormal returns represents a premium for some unidentified risk.
Several recent studies have focused on whether post-earnings-announcement drift in stock prices is best explained as a market inefficiency or a risk premium. Ball [1992, p. 342] argues, largely on the basis of evidence in Bernard and Thomas [1990] , that the phenomenon "seems most likely due to either substantial information-processing costs or market inefficiency." However, Ball adds that it is unclear what substantial information processing costs would prevent elimination of the anomaly, and that the implications of the evidence for market efficiency are inherently limited by "our substantially incomplete knowledge of security pricing in a competitive market" (p. 342). In other words, firm conclusions are rendered difficult by the same joint hypothesis problem first pointed out by Fama [1970] : that one cannot test market efficiency without simultaneously testing some model of expected returns. It is impossible to assure that evidence apparently at odds with market efficiency isn't actually an indication of shortcomings in the hypothesized asset pricing model and its characterization of risk.
This paper deals with the joint hypothesis problem by using a stochastic dominance approach. Like any test of market efficiency, this approach requires some assumptions about asset pricing. However, the assumptions are extremely mild. For example, if one is willing to assume that investors prefer more wealth to less, then first-order stochastic dominance of one security over another implies an arbitrage opportunity.
1 Second-order stochastic dominance also implies an arbitrage opportunity, so long as investors are assumed risk averse. Given how weak are these assumptions, a demonstration of stochastic dominance constitutes compelling evidence of market inefficiency.
The ability to test market efficiency while imposing only the mildest of assumptions about asset pricing comes, of course, at some potential cost. The difficulty is that stochastic dominance demands so much of the data that even gross market inefficiencies may fail to produce stochastically dominant trading strategies. Indeed, some might doubt that inefficiencies stark enough to pass a stochastic dominance test could survive in active markets. Such doubts may explain why stochastic dominance tests have been so rarely used in the literature. However, if there are instances where stochastic dominance can be demonstrated, then such evidence should eliminate any reasonable concerns that the related market anomaly could be attributed to a failure to control for risk.
The tests in this study provide striking evidence of stochastic dominance of stocks that have recently announced good earnings news over those that recently announced bad news. More specifically, over the quarter following the earnings announcement, the portfolio of stocks with scaled unexpected earnings (SUE) in the highest decile dominates the portfolio in the lowest decile by first-order stochastic dominance. The estimated probability of obtaining such a result by chance is less than one-half of one percent. Even after allowing for 3 percent round-trip transactions costs, the highest SUE decile portfolio dominates the lowest by second-order stochastic dominance.
More surprisingly, stochastic dominance often holds even between portfolios for which the SUE differences are less extreme. Among ten SUE decile portfolios, there are 45 possible pairs to be compared; in 35 of these 45 (nonindependent) cases, the portfolio with the higher SUE dominates the other by either first-order or second-order stochastic dominance. For the 15 (nonindependent) comparisons of SUE portfolios at least five deciles apart, the higher SUE decile portfolio dominates the lower by first-order or second-order stochastic dominance in every case. For this group of 15 comparisons, first-, second-, or third-order stochastic dominance continues to hold in 14 cases, even after allowing for a 3 percent round-trip transactions cost. The likelihood of observing such a result by chance is remote.
The results of this paper cast serious doubt on any belief that asset pricing model misspecifications might explain post-earnings-announcement drift. An understanding of this anomaly appears to require either some model of inefficient markets, or identification of some cost (other than transactions costs) that impede the impounding of public information in prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenon of post-earnings-announcement drift, and report estimates of
